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Draft Recommendation
on wealnnry after the Gulf war 
-
new equipment requiremenls fot rcstructurcd armed forces
The Assembly,
(i) Welcoming the continuing improvement in relations between all countries partrcipating in the
CSCE;
(ii) Recognising that the process of political ddtente, combined with the withdrawal of Soviet troops
from the territory of Central European nations and reductions of troops and equipment in the
framework of the CFE agreement have reduced the security risk in Central Europe;
(iii) Aware that economic deterioration and increasing political instability in the Soviet Union still
constitute a residual security risk for Central and Western Europe which cannot be ignored;
(ir,) Conscious that, in some parts of Eastern Europe, recent democratisation has also brought to the
fore a number of ethnic, national and economic difficulties, thus creating instability;
(v) Recognising that the Gulf war was very different from past wars, particularly in regard to new
technology and lessons and consequences have to be drawn from it,
(vi) Expecting that for many years to come the Near and Middle East will be an area of instability
with serious risks for the security and other interests of Europe;
(vii) Concerned that existing intelligence and surveillance systems failed to provide adequate infor-
mation on the military build-up prior to the invasion of Kuwait as was also the case in Afghanistan in
1979
(viii) Alarmed by developments in ballistic missile technology in a number of countries in the Medi-
terranean and in the Near and Middle East;
(ix) Aware that as a consequence of institutional constraints some possible security risks cannot be
controlled by NATO as such. but that in certain conditions, such as out-of-area crises, WEU can play a
useful complementary rdle;
(x) Convinced that WEU will need an operational capability in order to give Europe more influence
within NATO and the ability to respond with the United States to world events;
(xi) Convinced that a European rapid reaction force for use outside the NATO area would be logical
and compatible with NATO's responsibilities to defend NATO territory;
(xii) Aware of the new force structures which will be introduced in the allied forces, on both a
national and multinational level, based on the principles of flexibility, mobility and reinforcement,
RrcoprvrNns rHAT rHe CouNcr-
l. Urgently establish a WEU centre for satellite data interpretation as a first step towards setting up
a European observation satellite agency;
2. Thoroughly review national force reductions as soon as the Atlantic Alliance has reached deci-
sions regarding future allied force structures,
3. Instruct the committee of chiefs of defence staff of WEU to examine in detail the consequences
of future allied force structures and the lessons of the Gulf war for European military co-operation, in
particular with a view to studying:
(a) the possibility of setting up a European strategic airlift command equipped with a military
version of the Airbus A-340 and operating in a WEU framework;
(b) the ballistic missile threat on Europe's southern flank and a possible subsequent common
European requirement for an anti-ballistic missile capability;
(c) a common European requirement for a stand-off capability and precision-guided weapons.
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Explanatory Memorandum
(submitted by Sir Dudley Smith, Rapporteur)
I. Introduction
l. Less than one year ago, in July 1990,
European governments might have thought they
had finished with war as an ultimate resort in
crisis situations. The Soviet Union had been
extremely co-operative in solving a number of
remaining problems regarding the unification of
the two parts of Germany, the CFE was making
extraordinary progress, the Warsaw Pact had
practically decided to give up its military rdle,
its disbandment in the near future was inevi-
table and NATO had held its London summit
which terminated its sole existence as a leading
instrument in the containment of the Soviet
threat as it was perceived during the cold war.
2. In many Western European countries, the
public at large started to think that armed forces
were a remnant of a cursed past which should
now be forgotten. For some, the only reason not
to abolish armed forces at once was the possible
social and economic consequences for the mil-
itary and the suppliers of arms.
3. Events since August 1990 have again
proved how illusory those perceptions were. In
the Gulf area, Saddam Hussein's unpredictable
and volatile behaviour led to a major conflict,
but the military victory of the coalition forces
was by no means a guarantee of durable peace in
the Middle East, where many other questions
still remain unresolved. For years to come, the
Middle East will remain an area of instability
fraught with different possible threats to
Europe's security.
4. In the Soviet Union, the general situation
is apparently deteriorating and it is increasingly
clear that the central government is losing
control of the economic and political situation.
Inevitably this has already led to political com-
promise where, in many instances, " old guard "
forces have obtained the upper hand. In early
1991, Vilnius and Riga were the scene of inci-
dents which could in no way be compared with
the systematic repression which took place
under previous Soviet leadership but were
indeed a sobering reminder to the western
public that not all has yet changed in the Soviet
Union and attention should not therefore be
slackened. In fact, the Soviet Union's military
posture on NATO's northern and southern
flanks has not diminished. On the contrary, the
military forces assembled on the Kola peninsula
on Norway's northern border have been refined
and reinforced in recent months. Both the
Soviet Union and the Balkans are still inherently
unstable, bearing the seeds of possible conflicts
which may again threaten peace and security in
Europe.
5. History has shown that in international
relations it is extremely difficult for any of the
countries or alliances concerned to control more
than one serious conflict at a time.
6. The allied countries, be they American or
European, should therefore use any peaceful
means at their disposal to promote peace and
security in areas threatened by conflict. At the
same time, however, they should continue to
maintain armed forces which are capable of
guaranteeing their borders and controlling a
conflict when it comes to the worst and military
action is inevitable.
7. Referring to a sometimes confusing
debate on the future of Europe's security struc-
tures, it should be clearly stated here that,
according to the committee's firm conviction,
NATO is vital for European defence arrange-
ments to be credible. The United Kingdom
Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, put it rightly
when he said that there is a case for a stronger
European defence identity, but that NATO must
be an integral part of the future defence of
Europe. An approach which emphasised the sep-
arateness of Europe would seriously weaken its
real securityr.
8. The aim of this report is to attempt to see
what the alliance and in particular member
states of Western European Union are doing to
adapt their armed forces to a changing geopoli-
tical and military situation. At the same time. a
preliminary inventory is made of lessons from
the Gulf war. which may lead to new or more
detailed equipment requirements.
II. Revision of doctines and strategies
in NATO
9. The turbulent events of 1989 brought
about so many changes in the political and mil-
itary situation in Europe, which until then had
seemed frozen in immobility, that even NATO
was taken aback. It did not wait very long to
react, however, and the first important sign of
changes in NATO thinking appeared in the
London declaration on a transformed North
Atlantic Alliance issued by the heads of state
and government in London on 6th July 1990.
10. Some quotations from this declaration
and from communiqu6s of subsequent high-
l. Financial Trmes, l3th April l99l
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level meetings will be given here, since they
should form the basis for restructuring armed
forces in alliance countries and possible new
equipment requirements.
11. The London declaration stated that
* 
- 
NATO will field smaller and restruc-
tured active forces. These forces will
be highly mobile and versatile so that
allied leaders will have maximum
flexibility in deciding how to respond
to a crisis. It will rely increasingly on
multinational corps made up of
national units.
- 
NATO will scale back the readrness of
its active units, reducing training
requirements and the number of exer-
clses.
- 
NATO will rely more heavily on the
ability to build up larger forces if and
when they might be needed.
To keep the peace, the alliance must
maintain for the foreseeable future an
appropriate mix of nuclear and conven-
tional forces, based in Europe, and kept
up to date where necessary. But, as a
defensive alliance, NATO has always
stressed that none of its weapons will ever
be used except in self-defence and it seeks
the lowest and most stable level of nuclear
forces needed to secure the prevention of
war.
The political and militarT changes in
Europe and the prospects of further
changes now allow the allies concerned to
go further. They will thus modify the size
and adapt the tasks of their nuclear
deterrent forces. They have concluded
that, as a result of the new political and
military conditions in Europe, there will
be a significantly-reduced rOle for sub-
strategic nuclear systems of the shortest
range. They have decided specifically
that, once negotiations begin on short-
range nuclear forces. the alliance will
propose, in return for reciprocal action by
the Soviet Union, the ehmination of all its
nuclear artillery shells from Europe. "
12. The declaration explicitly approved the
mandate given in Turnberry to the North
Atlantic Council in Permanent Session to
oversee the ongoing work on the adaptation of
the alliance to the new circumstances. It then
continued as follows:
" In the context of these revised plans for
defence and arms control. and with the
advice of NATO military authorities and
all member states concerned, NATO will
prepare a new allied military strategy
moving away from forward defence,
where appropriate. towards a reduced
forward presence and modifying flexible
response to reflect a reduced reliance on
nuclear weapons. In that connection,
NATO will elaborate new force plans con-
sistent with the revolutionary changes in
Europe. NATO will also provide a forum
for allied consultation on the upcoming
negotiations on short-range nuclear
forces. "
13. The Eurogroup ministers met in Brussels
on 5th December 1990 when the tension in the
Gulf crisis was steadily increasing. They stressed
a specific European responsibility within the
alliance framework and confirmed the London
declaration as follows:
" Recent and continuing developments
have reinforced our conviction that the
European allies should take on an even
greater degree of responsibility for our
own defence. We welcome the devel-
opment of a strong, coherent and outward-
looking European identity, including in
the security area. It is part of a long-term
trend that the alliance has welcomed and
encouraged. It is also necessary for the
maintenance of a balanced and equitable
transatlantic partnership.
The alliance is in the process of adapting
to the changing security environment and
is therefore reviewing its strategy. We
fully endorse this process. We support
both the work in hand to develop a
coherent and credible allied force posture
in line with the emerging new strategy,
and the general directions in which this
work is moving. We stress the continuing
need for a co-ordinated approach to our
defence planning. We welcome in par-
ticular the increased emphasis on multi-
national formations as a contribution
towards strengthening collective defence,
transatlantic links and the European
security identity. We have approved work
on the defence planning issues arising out
of the impact of the CFE Treaty under-
taken in various Eurogroup fora, which
we will make available to the alliance. We
have tasked Eurogroup's subgroups to
continue to concentrate their work on
meeting the defence planning challenges
of the post-CFE era. "
14. This meeting was followed by meetings of
the Defence Planning Committee and the
Nuclear Planning Group of NATO. In the final
communique of these meetings, more details
were provided concerning the strategy review
process and the future character of allied forces,
in particular in paragraphs 7 and 8. which read
as follows:
" In this time of transition we are looking
forward and concentrating on the require-
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ments of the future. As directed by the
London summit, we are developing a new
military strategic concept for the alliance.
An important aim will be to provide
NATO's military authorities with policy
guidance upon which to develop a new
force posture and operational concepts.
We shall also take into account the inter-
relationship between defence capabilities,
arms control and the emerging co-oper-
ative security structures. Work on the
strategy review is proceeding well and we
expect to be in a position to approve the
new strategic concept next spring.
In our Defence Planning Committee
meeting we continued our consultations
on the changes which many member
countries are contemplating making in the
forces they contribute to the common
defence. We attach particular import-
ance to the close co-ordination of national
force plans, so that we maintain a
coherent alliance force posture, in line
with the emerging new strategy. Our aim
is to ensure enhanced stability and
security throughout the current period
of transition and also in the new
co-operative European security envi-
ronment. Our future force posture will be
based on smaller, more mobile and
flexible active forces, able to respond to
aggression from any quarter. A consid-
erable portion of our forces will be held at
lower levels of readiness and availability
but able to be built up and reinforced if
the need arises. We will increasingly rely
on multinational formations. which will
enhance co-operation between allies and
underline the collective nature of our
defence arrangements. A continued signif-
icant presence in Europe of forces from
the North American democracies is indis-
pensable. "
15. At the press conference, Secretary-
General Manfred Wcirner elaborated on the idea
of multinational forces. SACEUR had sub-
mitted a report on the progress made in the
study of this subject. An agreement on the prin-
ciples had been reached, but conclusions should
be presented before the summer of l99l
together with conclusions on the new NATO
strategy. Mr. Worner recalled that NATO
already had multinational forces such as
AWACS and on-call naval forces. The form and
mix of new multinational forces would be dif-
ferent, as well as their geographical zones and
tasks. The whole issue would be discussed in the
NATO Council, with the participation of
France.
16. Mr. Wcirner announced recently that this
transatlantic summit, originally planned for
June 1991, which would have approved the new
NATO strategy. will now take place in
November l99l). It seems that the discussion
on out-of-area activities and co-operation
between NATO, EEC and WEU and also a pos-
sibly changing attitude of France in the alliance
is requiring a longer period of reflection than
expected, while the attitude of the Soviet Union
towards implementation of the CFE Treaty
should also be clarified.
17. The communiqud after the North Atlantic
Minrsterial Council meeting on l8th December
1990 contained no news about the strategy
review or armed forces structures, but reflected
awareness of increasing discussions on a
European security identity and defence r6le in
paragraph 5, where it was said:
" The adaptation of our alliance to new
circumstances will include enhancing the
r6le of the European allies with a view to
ensuring a full and equitable sharing of
leadership and responsibilities between
Europe and North America. All allies
agree that the foundation ofEuropean sta-
bility and security will continue to be a
strong and viable North Atlantic Alliance
which requires the continuing active
political engagement and significant mil-
itary presence of the North American
democracies in Europe. A European
security identity and defence r6le,
reflected in the construction of a
European pillar within the alliance, will
not only serve the interests of the
European states but also help to
strengthen Atlantic solidarity. In this
context, and as this process evolves, we
will consider how the political and mil-
itary structures of the alliance must be
adapted accordingly.
We support current efforts to strengthen
the security dimension in the process
of European political rntegration, and
recognise the importance of the recent
decisions of the European Council in
Rome. We emphasise, in this regard, the
importance of safeguarding complemen-
tarity and transparency between the two
processes of the adaptation of the alliance
and of the development of European
security co-operation. "
18. One of the uncertainties of the moment is
that the western allies have not yet worked out a
new military strategy for the future. Strictly
speaking only a new common defence strategy
can be a sound basis for new force structures
and new equipment requirements. High-ranking
officials are negotiating now to adapt NATO's
long-standing strategy of forward defence and
flexible response to the new political and mrl-
2. Neue Zircher Zefiung,20th-2lst Apnl 1991.
DOCUMENT I272
itary situation in the world. It seems, however,
that little progress is being made, since the
debate on strategic issues is directly linked to the
political debate on the future r6le of NATO. The
central issue in this political debate is whether
NATO should be transformed into a more
political body with a broader task in order to
guarantee western security interests worldwide.
19. It is a significant indication of the changes
taking place in the alliance that France, which
left NATO's integrated military structure in
1966, apart from its long-standing participation
in the meetings of the North Atlantic Council
whrch is discussing issues of a political nature, is
now participating again in the work of the
NATO Defence Plannrng Committee since
March 1991. This committee is actually
assessing the change in risks since the actual dis-
solution of the Warsaw Pact, while taking into
account the still formidable strength of the
Soviet armed forces.
20. At the same time, however, France has
indicated that it will not participate in the next
phase of the committee's work, which is to
establish a new strategy in order to respond to
the changed risks. There can be no doubt that
France's behaviour is inspired by its wish to
keep up the appearance that it remains com-
pletely independent in establishing its strategy
and deploying its armed forces.
21. It remains to be seen how long it can
maintain this seemingly complete freedom of
action if it wishes seriously to set up a common
European security policy.
22. Undoubtedly, an up-to-date assessment of
the security risks faced by its members must be
the cornerstone of the alliance's new strategy
and doctrine. There is little disagreement that
the withdrawal of Soviet troops and equipment
from the territory of its former Warsaw Pact
allies and the continuing democratisation in
Central Europe greatly diminishes the risks of a
Soviet surprise attack on Western Europe. At
the same time, the instability, if not explo-
siveness in the Middle East. in the southern
republics of the Soviet Union and the potential
for conflict in North Africa is obvious enough
for the allied countries not to diminish their vig-
ilance on the southern flank.
23. Be that as it may, opinions on the situ-
ation on the northern flank are less clear and
when it comes to the security of Europe, both
politicians and the military in Norway feel their
country is being isolated. General Vigleik Eide,
chairman of NATO's military committee,
admits that Soviet forces in the north have been
kept at the same level, but he has pointed out
that the Soviet back-up system as a whole is
being reduced under the arms control treaties,
thus reducing the overall capacity for a real
offensive in the north. On the other hand he is
aware that Soviet troops in the north can more
rapidly be a threat since warning times in the
flanking regions will be shorter.
24. The Norwegian defence minister, Johan
Jorgen Holst has pointed out that the Soviet mil-
itary concentration on the Kola peninsula is still
being reinforced. This view is backed on all
political sides. Aging bombers and combat-
aircraft have recently been replaced by Tu-26
Backfires and MiG-27 Floggers, the aircraft
carrier " Admiral Kuznetsov " is joining the
northern fleet and Soviet amphibious forces
have been strengthened with the redesignation
of motor rifle divisions as naval infantry. As
another sign of the Soviet belief in the
importance of this zone, it should be mentioned
that it has announced large amphibious exer-
cises in the northern area. to be held in Sep-
tember 1991.
25. He said that the defence of the northern
flank is still very dependent on reinforcement,
and this should remain a priority not to be
diminished. Since reinforcements for northern
Norway have to be arctic-equipped and trained,
there should at least be an element of NATO's
future rapid reaction corps to meet these
requirements.
26. It is quite clear that notwithstanding the
lack of decisions on a new strategy and on con-
nected issues, member states on both sides of the
Atlantic did not wait to introduce major cuts in
defence expenditure with important conse-
quences for the future of their armed forces.
Likewise. the mutual consultations ministers
called for before taking national decisions have
apparently been less decisive than the national
finance mrnisters' calls for budget cuts. There is
a rush for budget cuts without regard for the
long-term consequences in an Atlantic or
European framework.
27 . The question remains if this process of the
apparent lack of international co-ordination in
national defence expenditure reductions does
not draw heavily on the alliance's capability to
respond adequately to the changes in security
risks.
28. Possible options now being considered
in allied discussions such as facing the risk
of regional conflicts, improved reinforcement
capability outside the central region. the
eventual need for graduated military options in
the fields of readiness and mobilisation and also
for available, combat-ready forces of high flexi-
bility and of a multinatronal character demand
careful planning. Meticulous co-ordination of all
different national force structures and pro-
curement is essential for building a successful
new defence posture. It deserves more
attention.
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IIL Future allied force structures
29. While both the North Atlantic Council
and the Defence Planning Committee respec-
tively are still continuing their drawn-out discus-
sions to define a political concept of NATO's
r6les and purposes in the future and to review
strategic concepts, the Military Committee has
made great progress in designing a new force
structure.
30. This appears to be building a new security
framework in reverse order, but the Military
Committee was particularly keen to reach early
conclusions because all allied member countries
are already making national force plans and
reducing their defence expenditure in order to
adapt to the changing East-West relations.
31. In an early stage of the discussions,
agreement had been reached on a number of
basic principles:
- 
there will be a lower level of forces and
a lower degree of readiness;
- 
flexibility and mobility are essential in
order to allow for rapid counter-
concentration options against any kind
of threat:
- 
reinforcement capacity, also implying a
greater reliance on reserve forces, will
have greater importancel
- 
a multinational integration of some key
forces will be indispensable 3.
32. Military experts generally agreed that any
reappraisal of force structures should take
account of the gradually inevitable fact that the
United States forces in Europe will be consid-
erably reduced in the near future. Recently, a
United States panel of twenty-six experts on
Atlantic security, including leading Republican
and Democrat members of Congress, recom-
mended that the United States cut its NATO
forces by two-thirds in an effort to give the
Europeans the job of defending Europe.
33. Most European security experts are also
assuming that the United States will not leave
more than about 70 000 of its troops in Europe
after 1994, when the Soviet troops should have
left the territory of its former Warsaw Pact allies
in Central Europe.
34. The abovementioned panel advocated
Iimiting United States ground combat forces to a
small number of troops and placing them in
multinational units instead of the large, wholly
American units now deployed.
35. The French Foreign Minister, Roland
Dumas, while explaining the Franco-German
3. The rssue of multinational forces ts betng considered rn
detarl in the Defence Committee's report: Arms control:
Force reductrons and the r6le of multinational unrts.
proposal for a common European foreign and
security policy, radically suggested that Western
European Union could well be the point of
departure for a European armed force sui
generis {.
36. Mr. Willem van Eekelen, WEU's Secretary-
General, in trying to steer a reasonable middle
course, proposed the establishment of multina-
tional European as well as American-European
units which could be deployed as rapid reaction
forces. The strictly European forces could be
deployed for out-of-area operations not only in
the Mediterranean and the Middle East but also
in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. These
European multinational forces should be organ-
ised at the lowest possible level. An air-mobile
division for the northern sector could for
instance consist of Belgian, British. Dutch and
German units. French forces would have no dif-
ficulty in participating because they could con-
sider these forces as inherently European 5.
37. The Federal Republic is preparing to
change its constitution so as to enable its armed
forces to operate outside the area covered by the
North Atlantic Treaty. According to the recent
debates on the Federal budget in March 1991,
the government is seriously examining how
the Federal armed forces could participate injoint action in the framework of an adequate
European security structure such as Western
European Union. Mr. Stoltenberg, the Federal
Defence Minister, said that valuable and proven
ways of multinational co-operation should be
maintained in essence. At the same time,
however, he said, there are cases, such as the cre-
ation of rapid reaction forces, where increased
integration makes sense and others where it is
useful and compulsory, when a country is no
longer able to deploy its own operative forces in
certain sectors 6.
38. German sources consider multinational
forces consisting of units from different allied
nations to be of great importance for reinforcing
the political basis for the deployment of armed
forces in an allied framework. Such forces would
also contribute to keeping alive the defence
co-operation between the United States and
Europe after the CFE arms reductions. The
deployment of allied armed forces should be
more evenly spread over Europe's territory in
order to improve flexibility and mobility in
crisis situations and also to replace the east-
bound forward defence on German territory by
multifacetted distribution with capabilities to
reassemble quickly, but without permanently
being directed towards the east i.
39. William Taft, the United States per-
manent representative to the No(h Atlantic
4. Le Monde. l2th March 1991.
5. NRC-Handelsblad. lst March 1991.
6. Address rn Bonn on l3th March 1991.
7. Die Welt, 29th June 1990.
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Council, speaking on European security in a new
world order. made it clear that his nation sup-
ports a European pillar which does not duplicate
the alliance and one which operates within the
alliance to do alliance tasks and outside the
alliance only where it wishes to take on new mis-
slons.
40. At the same time he stressed that NATO's
efforts towards a more collective approach to
defence 
- 
for example, the development of mul-
tinational units within the integrated structure 
-
should continue to parallel progress towards
greater European integration in other areas.
41. In order to understand better what
Ambassador Taft meant, it should be noted here
that the alliance's future tasks are an issue on
which the United States and a number of its
European allies still disagree.
42. On l2th April last, the NATO Military
Committee reached agreement on the design for
a new force structure which will be submitted to
the ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic
Council in Copenhagen on 6th and 7th June
1991. This agreement makes a distinction
between three different levels of formations.
Main de.fence 
.forces. These forces are
the largest section of the forces of
allied countries and they will be in a
lesser state of preparation.
Reaction 
.lbrces. A distinction will be
made between:
Imrnediate reaction 
.forces, to be
formed after the fashion of the
Allied Command Europe Mobile
Force (AMF), a multinational
brigade-sized force, supported by
fighter squadrons from several
nations, and trained for opera-
tions on NATO's northern and
southern flanks.
Rapid reaction 
.forces, which
should be of army corps size
(70 000 ro 100 000 men) and
drawn from units of European
member countries' forces, with
United States air support. The
type of command for these forces
has not yet been decided. It is still
to be decided whether one
country should assume command
or whether it should be rotated
among participating countries.
These forces may be based in
Germany, but several other
options are still being discussed.
The combat-ready rapid reaction
force could be sent from Central
Europe to keep the peace or do
battle elsewhere. It is thought that
the whole force need not always
be activated in cases of emer-
gency. Parts of it may be sent,
shaped to fit the circumstances of
action. It could also intervene
under different hats. It could
operate under NATO command
within the area covered by the
North Atlantic Treaty; if an out-
of-area operation were required,
the European units could do thejob under WEU responsibility.
The equipment of this force
should be adapted to its rdle,
which means that it should have
a wide range of armour and
armaments, and also be able to
move quickly if required. Air-
mobility would be an essential
characteristic. It goes without
saying that, with a view to com-
bined operations, the equipment
and resources of the different
national units should be inter-
changeable and based on stand-
ardised designs.
(iii) Back-up or augmentation 
.forces.
While part of these forces should be
active serving units for maintaining
and exercising purposes, they would
mainly consist of reservists. The
equipment of these forces should be
stored and prepositioned in combat-
ready conditions.
IY. The restructuring of national armed forces
43. In this chapter, a succinct synopsis will be
given of the state of affairs rn the restructuring
of the armed forces in each of the member coun-
tries of WEU.
Belgium
44. On 24th December 1990, the Belgian
Government approved the Charlier II pro-
gramme for restructuring the armed forces.
45. One of the programme's objectives is to
reduce the defence budget by 100/o over a
five-year period. The army's total strength will
be reduced from 4 active and 2 reserve brigades
to 3 active, of which one will remain on German
territory, and one reserve brigade. As a conse-
quence, the number of active army battalions
will be reduced from 4l to 22. The paratroop
regiment will not be affected.
46. The air force will phase out its B-727
transport aircraft and a programme to update its
existing 12 C-130 Hercules should be completed
by 1995. One fighter-bomber attack squadron
equipped with Mirage-5 BA will be disbanded.
The Mirage-5 BRs of the tactical reconnaissance
squadron will be updated, while all F-16 A/Bs of
(t)
( ii)
(a)
(b)
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the remaining six squadrons will go through a
midlife update. which should enable them to
remaln rn servlce well beyond the turn of the
century.
47. The navy will retire l4 old mine-sweepers
and reduce the operational availability of the
remaining ships. A decision to equip the four
existing frigates with a modern air defence
system has not yet been taken and different
systems are now being examined by the navy.
France
48. In July 1989, the French Government
adopted " Armdes 2000 ", a plan to simplify and
better harmonise the territorial structures of its
armed services. It has since been readapted
twice in view of the changed situation in Central
Europe.
49. The plan is based on three principles:
operationality as a prerequisite, coherence ofthe
organisation and development of interservice
co-operation. Three main areas of interest are
distinguished: the north-east region to meet
crisis threats in Central Europe. the Mediter-
ranean region oriented towards the south and
the Atlantic region to protect the ocean supply
lines. The French defence budget as percentage
of the GNP has been decreasing for a number of
years: from 3.670/o in 1988 to 3.610/o in 1989;
3.54o/o in 1990 down to 3.37o/o in 1991. As far as
equipment expenditure is concerned, the budget
for l99l is reduced by 2.60/o in constant francs as
compared to the 1990 budget. In the defence
budget for I991, several programmes have been
cut or slowed down.
50. The army in particular will suffer from
the budget reductions. Orchid6e, the helicopter-
borne battle surveillance programme, for which
800 million francs have already been spent, was
abandoned. As a consequence of the Gulf war,
however, there are chances of its revival in a
more modest version, called Horizon. Other-
wise, as a consequence of the reduction of army
corps from three to two there will only be two
regiments of multipleJaunch rocket systems
instead of the three originally planned. Pro-
grammes for armoured and tactical vehicles and
also for engineering equipment have been
reduced. The acquisition programme for the
AMX Leclerc main battle tank has been reduced
from I 400 to 800 tanks.
51. In 1983, France created its rapid inter-
vention force (FAR), which certainly facilitated
its participation in the Gulf war. The FAR's
equipment is, however, open to criticism and
experts say that it is short of performing
artillery, battletanks, adequate air defence
systems and long distance air transport capa-
bility.
52. It has five divisions and a logistics
brigade, altogether 63 000 men, of which 700/o
are professionals.
53. The army divrsion " Daguet ", deployed
in the Gulf area during the war, was composed
of elements from several different FAR units.
54. The French Defence Minister, Pierre
Joxe, is now considering building on this expe-
rience and constituting a new interservice unit
capable of accomplishing long-distance mis-
slons.
55. While the original FAR was set up for
deployment in low- or middle-intensity combat.
the Gulf war demonstrated that future out-
of-area conflicts may well require heavier, better
equipped forces with more modern technology.
56. While the FAR is based on a armour-
helicopters combination, there will be a need to
increase ground-ground and ground-air artillery,
to reinforce engineering and transmission
support, to give it heavier tanks and auton-
omous intelligence equipment and to increase
logistics. In peacetime, it should be manned by
long- or short-term professionals and voluntary
conscripts in order to keep the operational quali-
fications at a high level.
51. For the air force, all efforts are being con-
centrated on the development of the new tactical
combat aircraft Rafale, its air-to-air missile
Mica and its stand-off air-ground weapon
Apache. This priority had a negative influence
on the number of Mirage 2000 combat aircraft
being ordered, while it may also affect the future
replacement of the aging fleet of Transall
transport aircraft.
58. The navy has slowed down the building of
its nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Charles de
Gaulle and is phasing out the Clemenceau, for
which no replacement has yet been ordered. The
first of a new class of surveillance frigates,
Flor6al, is under construction, while a light
frigate programme is under development. The
construction of a third and fourth anti-air-
warfare frigate has been postponed, because the
new anti-air-warfare system has not yet made
sufficient progress.
59. Recently, it was decided to decommission
the guided-missile cruiser Colbert in 1991
instead of 1993, as originally planned.
60. Repeated navy pleas to replace its vintage
Crusader interceptor aircraft by McDonnell
Douglas A/F-18 Hornets have met with no
response and instead l7 Crusaders will now be
modernised insofar as possible, while waiting for
their replacement by the naval version of the
Rafale in 1998.
61. The replacement of the Brdguet Atlan-
tique I maritime surveillance aircraft by its suc-
cessor Atlantique II is not up to schedule.
62. In the wake of the Gulf war, President
Mitterrand urged the French parliament to
undertake a thorough debate on the organisation
of the armed forces, their nature and compo-
sition.
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Germany
63. According to an intragovernmental agree-
ment, the defence budget will be reduced from
DM 57 500 million in 1990 to DM 52 600
million in 1991, with a portion of about 720/o lor
organisation and maintenance costs and 280/o for
investments. About 630/o of these investments
are assigned for military procurement purposes.
The reduction of the defence budget is a reper-
cussion of the unification process and has to be
put into perspective: 1989 
- 
52 500 million;
1990 
- 
57 500 million;budget for the merging of
two armies, 1991 - 52600 million.
64. During the period 1991 to 1995, the total
number of active military personnel will be
reduced from 515000 (lst January l99l) to
370 000, a ceiling which has been specified in
international agreements. Accordingly, the
wartime strength will be increased to 900 000.
By the end of 1994, active personnel will be dis-
tributed to the three services as follows: army -
255 400, air force 82 400, and navy 32 200 per-
sonnel. In the western part of Germany, two
combined territorial corps commands will
replace the current three independent corps and
three independent territorial commands. The
eight new regional division commands will
replace the present 12 independent divisions
and 6 military district commands in Western
Germany.
65. The air force will shift its priorities
towards reconnaissance and air defence at the
expense of air attack capabilities, 45 Tornado
aircraft will be taken over from the navy.
However, the air force will reduce its overall air-
craft inventory from the present more than
I 000 to less than 500.
66. The navy's present blue water component(Frigates with ASW helicopters embarked,
destroyers and maritime patrol aircraft) will be
practically maintained until the year 2005 with a
temporary reduction in the number of ships to
l2 by the year 1995. The Baltic component (fast
patrol boats, SAR helicopters and Tornado
fighter-bombers) will undergo a significant
reduction. Mine counter-measure vehicles and
submarines, operating in either area, will be
gradually decreased.
67. The intermediate strength of the
Bundeswehr in the new Ldnder (former territory
of the GDR) will be around 50 000 soldiers, pro-
jected to increase after the withdrawal of Soviet
forces from German soil up to the final total of
approximately 70 000 active peacetime strength.
68. A number of decisions still have to be
taken about equipment rnherited from the
former East German army 
- 
especially treaty-
limited items and ammunition.
69. No MiG-22s or MiG-23s will be flown
operationally in the German air force. The
further determination of the MiG-29s is not yet
decided, the aircraft are currently subject to a
test programme which will be finished early in
summer this year.
70. The future of mat6riel that cannot be used
in the Bundeswehr is subject to consideration -
partly to negotiation. Several former Warsaw
Pact member countries have shown interest in
some of these items.
11. Meanwhile, the question of arms delivery
contracts signed by the GDR before unification
has been solved in mutual agreement with the
Soviet Union.
12. At the moment. there are still 320 000
Soviet soldiers on German soil. The withdrawal
is taking place according to the ratified
agreement and is ahead of plan in some areas.
Italy
73. ln 1989, the Italian defence budget
totalled approximately Lire 21000 billion, or
around 2-2.5o/o of GNP, and for l99l it has been
fixed at Lire 24 000 billion or roughly l.7o/o of
GNP.
74. In fact, in July 1988 a study was initiated
" Project 2000 ", which was intended to be a
guideline for restructuring the armed forces. In
Project 2000 it was originally assumed that Italy
would allocate around 2.50/o of its GNP to
defence. Meanwhile. a government decision has
reduced this base-line figure to 2o/o of GNP.
Further cuts are envisaged in which defence
spending may be reduced to l0lo of GNP.
15. In 1989, the equipment budget totalled
around Lire 5 000 billion, but the l99l budget
estimates only 4 000 billion for modernising the
three services. There is no long-term or
short-term investment planning.
76. Due to defence budget cuts and lack of
conscripts, the army had to disband about 30
battalions in 1989 and 1990. A large part of the
equipment of the armed forces is out of date.
Tanks in use are first generation Leopards,
M-47s and M-60s. The artillery is also out of
date.
77. The air force has 96 Tornados, but at the
same time is still flying 150 vintage F-104s. The
new AMX. an attack bomber, is now in pro-
duction. A first batch of 2l aircraft has been
delivered to the Italian air force, while delivery
of a second batch of 59 AMX is under way.
There is a total requirement of 238 AMX air-
craft. The EFA will be available only towards
the end of the century.
78. The navy is not in a more favourable situ-
ation with one new aircraft-carrier, the Gari-
baldi, without aircraft because its Harriers will
be delivered only at the end of 1991, while both
submarines and cruisers are vintage models,
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with only two submarine replacements under
construction.
19. Four years ago, a rapid intervention force
was created, but it is composed mainly of
insufficiently-trained conscripts without proper
means of transport.
80. It is said that a new defence white paper
will be published in April l99l which is believed
to aim at lighter and better-equipped armed
forces which could be integrated into the
European-Atlantic defence system. It is also said
to favour a large degree of professionalism,
together with a reduction of conscripts in the
armed forces.
The Netherlands
81. In March 1991, the Netherlands Gov-
ernment released a defence white paper,
announcing a thorough reorganisation of the
Dutch armed forces. In the following para-
graphs, some of the proposals made in the white
paper are highlighted, but it should be borne in
mind that it has not yet been discussed in
parliament, and that further cuts may be
expected.
82. Overall defence spending will be cut by
2o/o tn real terms in each of the years 1992, 1993
and 1994 and will then be frozen at around
l3 400 million Dutch guilders per year until
2001, with annual adjustments to be made for
inflation. Compared with present spending
Ievels, the cuts will save I 600 million guilders
through 1994 and an aditional 5 000 million
guilders between 1995 and 2001. Weapons pro-
curement spending will total about 2 980 million
guilders per year from 1992 through 2001.
Reduced procurement spending during this
period will save 3 000 million guilders.
83. A major programme is the setting up of an
airmobile brigade for which 3140 million
guilders will be spent. This airmobile brigade,
capable of deploying as part of a NATO multi-
national division or in support of United
Nations missions, will consist of three light
infantry battalions and fire support, combat
engineer and logistic elements. The Dutch armyis planning to lease 20 armed helicopters
by 1992 (MBB Bo-105, Agusta A-129 or
McDonnell Douglas Apache) and buy 40
combat helicopters as from 1996 (improved
McDonnell Douglas Apache or Eurocopter
Tiger). Furthermore, starting in 1993, some
25 troop transport helicopters will be bought.
84. The number of divisions will be reduced
from three to two. The army will phase out all its
486 Leopard I-V tanks before 1996.
85. A light brigade of one tank battalion, one
armoured infantry battalion and two reconnais-
sance battalions will be part of the multinational
guard force to be stationed in the Federal
Republic.
86. The air force will upgrade all its nine
squadrons of F-16 AiB combat aircraft in a
major midlife update programme together with
other allied nations. Modifications will include
the reconnaissance and electronic warfare equip-
ment, improved air-to-air and air-to-ground
weapons and adaptation for in-flight refuel-
ling.
8'7. Also envisaged is the procurement of new
transport arrcraft, including two large transport
aircraft with tanker capability and six tactical
transport aircraft, possibly the CASA CN-235 or
the Alenia G-222.
88. The navy will gradually phase out a
number of elderly frigates and mine-hunters, but
new frigates and submarines are under con-
struction. With a slightly smaller navy, structure
and quality of the naval forces will be main-
tained.
Portugal
89. The Portuguese Government is preparing
a defence white paper to be submitted to par-
liament before the end of May 1991. It has
already become known that the government
intends to reduce military service to 4 months,
but, at the same time, it is examining the possi-
bility of engaging volunteers for a longer period
of 18 to 36 months.
90. In the navy, three new frigates are now
being commissioned while 5 Lynx helicopters
will be acquired for use on frigates. There are
also plans to replace existing older submarines
and mine-hunters.
91. The air force is to have 20 F-16 A/Bs,
older aircraft being gradually phased out.
92. No decisions have yet been taken as
regards armoured personnel carriers and tanks
which should be given to the Portuguese army as
part of the cascading of equipment by other
NATO allies.
Spqin
93. Spain plays a major geostrategic r61e in
the rearguard of the NATO countries and in the
front line in the Western Mediterranean area.
For this reason, all events in this area of the
Mediterranean, including regions of the North
African countries are significant. Consequently,
the Strait of Gibraltar and the sea lanes leading
to it are considered key areas for Spain's
defence. Many of the national defence resources
of the three different services are therefore in
the southern military areas of the country. In
November 1988. agreement was reached
between NATO and Spain for making its contri-
bution to the common defence effort, priority
being given to the normal area of Spanish opera-
tions and interests.
l1
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94. The army now has 15 brigades. In 1988
the decision was made to set up a rapid reaction
force. Implementation awaits further analysis of
its composition. It has been determined that it
will not have a fixed organic structure. A
division headquarters is being created within the
army component. The combat units will be
assigned for operations or exercises each time
according to the planned task following the task
force principle. The parachute brigade and the
legion forces, plus a light brigade are initially the
units to be trained to operate with the rapid
reaction force. This rapid reaction force may
also be used to accomplish missions for the
common defence of the alliance, but it needs
further airlift capability to be really effective.
The artillery is aging and new and better heli-
copters are required for both transport and
attack r6les. A total of l8 A6rospatiale Super
Puma transport helicopters have recently been
delivered and Spain has shown interest in the
Franco-German Tiger helicopter to replace its
MBB BO-105s. The oldest existing tanks in the
units, M-47s and M-48s, now need to be
replaced. Studies for the selection of a new tank
have been held up in anticipation of the transfer
to Spain of M-60 tanks as a result of the CFE
Treaty.
95. The backbone of the Spanish air force is
formed by the 9 fighter squadrons of the air
combat command, consisting of 4 squadrons of
EF-I8 AWX/FBA, 3 squadrons of Mirage F-l
AWX/FBA and 2 squadrons of Mirage III
FBA/CWI. In addition, the tactical air
command consists of I squadron of F-5A
FBA/IDF, 2 squadrons of F-5B TRG/FBA and I
squadron of F-5A TRF/IDF.
96. The air force's transport command is
mainly equipped with C-130 Hercules, C-212
Aviocars and CN-235 Casa Nurtanio.
97. The Mirage IIIs are currently being
modernised, a modernisation programme for
the F-5Bs also having been approved, with fore-
casts for a later modernisation of the F-5A and
RF. There is a programme to develop a light
fighter-aircraft, the AX which should be pro-
duced by Casa but this is still in a preliminary
state and subject to many uncertainties.
98. The Plan del Alta Mar. an ambitious
enhancement and modernisation programme for
the Armada, the Spanish navy, during the years
1989-2002 is still rn force without major funding
problems. There will however be a one-year
delay in the programme for 8 new mine-hunters
and possibly in the building of 2 Santa Maria
class frigates.
99. The government has cut the defence
budget for l99l by 7.9o/o as compared to the
budget for 1990, but the consequences of this
reduction for the different services and their
equipment programmes are not quite clear yet.
United Kingdom
100. In July 1990, Defence Secretary Tom
King presented the results of the study " Options
for Change ", a preliminary outline of the future
structure of the British armed forces. Originally,
the government had planned to publish a
defence white paper in March l99l after consul-
tations with its NATO allies, but publication has
now been delayed in order to allow the Ministry
of Defence to examine the implications of the
Gulf war.
l0l. In a recent report on defence expenditure
plans through 1993-94, the Ministry of Defence
reaffirmed its basic intentions to restructure the
armed forces and reduce defence spending.
Although there will be additional costs for force
deployment in the Gulf this year, there will be a
downward trend in the years to come. While
defence spending for 1989-90 is estimated at
L2l 200 million, the estimate for 1990-91 is
L22 100 million, for l99l-92 f.22 800 million,
for 1992-93 f.23 350 million and for 1993-94
L23 390 million. a decline in real terms if the
expected inflation rate is taken into account. As
a percentage of GNP, defence spending would
decline from 4o/o in 1990-91 to 3.40/o in
1993-94.
102. The " Options for Change " study pro-
posed to cut the overall strength of the armed
forces by 180/o to 255 000 by 1995. According to
the Defence Secretary, the general aim is smaller
forces, better equipped, properly trained,
flexible and mobile and able to contribute both
in NATO and, if necessary, elsewhere.
103. At the moment, the army's rapid response
capability consists of one airborne brigade and
the Royal Marines' 3rd commando brigade
which can be committed to out-of-area opera-
tions. The study has proposed to improve this
capability by grouping the Royal Marines' 3rd
commando brigade, the 5th airborne brigade,
the 24th airmobile brigade and unspecified
armoured formations into a strategic reserve
division. This would require the acquisition of
light armoured vehicles and other suitable
equipment, while more investments would be
required in the field of air-and-sealift capacity.
104. Other changes proposed include a
reduction of the British Army of the Rhine from
four to two divisions and a reduction of the
Royal Air Force (RAF) Germany from 15 to 9
squadrons.
105. " Options for Change " further recom-
mended that the RAF phase out its 4 F-4
Phantom squadrons, while three out of I I
Tornado GRI/IA squadrons should be dis-
banded, with the aircraft of 2 disbanded
squadrons to replace the RAF Buccaneers in the
maritime strike r6le after having been upgraded
for their new mission.
t2
DOCL]MENT I272
106. " The number of Tornado F-3 squadrons
should be increased from 6 to 7, while the
3 Jaguar squadrons should remain in service
until their replacement in the late 1990s. In
the Federal Republic, the RAF will maintain
9 squadrons, including 4 Tornado GRI/IA,
2 Harrier GR5, I Andover and 2 helicopter
units.
107. The Royal Navy should retain its three
Invincible class aircraft-carriers and its full Fleet
Air Arm, but the number of frigates and
destroyers will be reduced from 48 to about 40,
while the submarine force will be slimmed down
from 27 to 16.
108. No new date has yet been fixed for the
publication of the defence white paper.
Y. Lessons from the Gulf war
109. The Gulf war, which lasted from 17th
January to 27th February l99l and ended in a
victory of the coalition forces, has been a
massive operation on a scale which rather came
as a surprise to all allied countries involved. It
occurred at a time when nations in both East
and West were trying to take stock of the results
of the CFE (conventional forces in Europe)
negotiations in Vienna and growing ddtente
through important reductions in their armed
forces and the reduction of defence expend-
iture.
I10. In the early stage of the Gulf war, a
number of western and Arab nations deployed
forces in Saudi Arabia in order to contain any
further Iraqi aggression. The United States and
Western European nations 
- 
with considerable
success under the authority of WEU - deployed
naval forces in the Gulf area for the same
purpose and also in order to enforce an eco-
nomic embargo.
I I l. Meanwhile, the Security Council adopted
a number of resolutions which should have
made clear to Saddam Hussein that his position
was untenable and that he had virtually no
choice other than to retreat from Kuwait. For a
number of reasons, however, Saddam Hussein
was intransigent and so the coalition countries
entered into a " logic of war " as President
Mitterrand called it.
ll2. Against the massive Iraqi forces, sheer
numbers counted, and all those who had thought
that, after the end of the cold war, relatively
small rapid intervention forces would be enough
to control regional conflicts witnessed a build-up
of the coalition forces on Saudi Arabian ter-
ritory which, notwithstanding impressive air
and naval transport capacity, took months
before enough were assembled to take the calcu-
lated risk of an offensive operation.
ll3. In several recent reports of the WEU
Assembly Defence Committee, a detailed
account has been given of the quantity and
quality of coalition forces assembled in the Gulf
area 8.
114. As has often been the case in history, the
war operations did not develop as expected.
After weeks of extensive air operations, the
ground offensive took only four days to achieve
the objectives. There were no large tank battles
and it almost appeared as if Kuwait was recap-
tured by surprise.
ll5. While all European defence ministries
have started to analyse their future military
requirements in terms of the Gulf war, they say
that it is far too early to draw final conclusions.
Their analysis will cover the capability of
equipment, the preparation of the armed forces,
logistics and the development of new weapon
systems. Cautiously they add that it will most
probably not reverse the general downward
trend of defence expenditure, but it is admitted
that the decline may well slow down.
I 16. The following paragraphs will review
certain specific factors and equipment which
played major r6les in the war.
(, The wtal rdle o.f satellites
ll7. From the first days of the Gulf crisis to
the air operations and the ground war it has
become increasingly clear that satellites have
played a vital r61e. Many kinds of military
spacecraft have enabled the allied forces to be
informed in real time about a wide range of
developments.
118. In the first months after the day of the
invasion, military intelligence satellites of dif-
ferent types provided a faithful picture of the
build-up of Iraqi forces in Kuwait and neigh-
bouring Iraqi territory.
119. As regards the war operations, military
weather satellites provided highly-detailed
weather information, indispensable for planning
all kinds of military operations, be they bombing
missions or airborne missions to provide
support and cover for ground troops or military
activity on the ground and naval operations.
120. Reconnaissance satellites of various types
provided information about Iraqi positions,
assessed the damage achieved by air raids and
provided information about weak spots in the
Iraqi defence lines. The United States navy used
its UHF communications satellites to relay
imagery from spy satellites to ships at sea. which
in turn were able to display images very shortly
after data reception, using their fleet imagery
support terminals.
13
8. See Documents 1243. 1248 and 1268
DOCUMENT I272
l2l. The Navstar global positioning system,
providing precise navigational information
which enables a hand-held receiver to determine
its location, has also proved to be extremely
useful. This system facilitated navigation for
vehicles in the desert and enabled the artillery to
home in on enemy targets accurately and
quickly. Aircraft in bombing raids or other mis-
sions could, with the help of Navstar, fulfil their
task with the greatest accuracy.
122. United States defence support programme
satellites, intended to alert United States offi-
cials about launches of long-range nuclear bal-
listic missiles, were actually used to provide
information about the launches of Iraqi Scud
missiles and from which direction they were
coming. This information enabled the crews of
Patriot missiles to react accordingly.
123. Communications intelligence satellites
provided information on Iraqi radio transmis-
sions. Finally, a number of communications sat-
ellites facilitated the transmission of innu-
merable communications at all times.
124. Satellites and reconnaissance aircraft of
different types have provided crucial infor-
mation regarding the Iraqi forces and their
activities. Numbers and types of material
deployed, communications, radar signals and
other electronic signals were all known in detail
and this gave the coalition forces an important
vital edge in the preparation of adequate mil-
itary actions.
125. It should be noted, however, that during
the Gulf war, satellites which had in principle
been deployed for strategic data collection on
Warsaw Pact activities were increasingly used
for tactical purposes. Some incidents, such as
the bombing of a bunker in the Al-Amiriyak dis-
trict of Baghdad and the initially unnoticed
experimental launching of three Iraqi Scud mis-
siles on 2nd December 1990 have raised doubts
about the expediency of already using intelli-
gence satellites for tactical purposes.
126. The point should be made here that satel-
Iites, however sophisticated their equipment,
can never be the only means of intelligence gath-
ering. Other means such as reconnaissance air-
craft and special forces, operating behind enemy
lines are compulsory additional elements in
order to have a complete and faithful picture of
the enemy's strength and activity and of the
effects of one's own activity on the enemy's ter-
ritory.
127. It needs no explanation that modern
armed forces would lose much of their effec-
tiveness if they were to operate without varied
support from a vast range of different military
spacecraft. Even if many national armed forces
consider military satellites to be an exotic and
unaffordable luxury, these have now proved to
be an indispensable factor in modern warfare,
saving literally thousands of lives.
128. European armed forces would do well not
to ignore this practical lesson. It under-
standably, each of them individually is unable to
obtain the financial means necessary for such
expensive systems, they should at least seriously
consider the possibility of procuring a military
satellite system in a co-operative effort.
129. According to Space News, I I th- I 7th
March 1991, the French Defence Minister,
Pierre Joxe, publicly stated that observation sat-
ellites were responsible in large measure for the
quick coalition victory in the Gulf. He proposed
that the international community should use
space-based means of observation to track arms
movements worldwide.
130. He furthermore ventured that one of the
great lessons of the Gulf war for the future was
that if the international community was willing,
space technology should be employed to assure
disarmament, verify compliance and monitor
the illicit traffic of arms.
(iil Precision-guided weapons
l3l. Precision-guided weapons played a con-
siderable, if not decisive, r6le rn knocking out
important targets on the territory of Iraq and
occupied Kuwait.
132. Of the total of 88 500 tons of bombs
dropped on Iraq and occupied Kuwait, laser-
guided or " smart " bombs accounted for only
6 520 tons, of which 900/o hit their intended
targets. while the unguided bombs had an
accuracy rate of only about 25010.
133. The ability of aircraft to destroy Iraqi
targets with unguided bombs had been overesti-
mated. It was reported that after more than 100
missions in which F-15E, F-16 and F/A-18 air-
craft failed to knock out any of 42 important
bridges, United States military planners directed
F-ll7 stealth and F-lll fighter-bombers to do
the job with 50O-pound laser-guided bombs, and
they succeeded in accomplishing their mission.
Of a total of 54 bridges attacked with precision-
guided munitions, 40 were rendered unusable
and l0 more were damaged.
134. It should nevertheless be borne in mind,
that the cost of a " smart " bomb is easily a
hundred times the cost of a gravity bomb of
comparable size. Precision-guided weapons cost
about $100 000 to 130 000 each, roughly a fifth
of the cost of an air-launched missile and one-
tenth that of a Tomahawk cruise missile. which
delivers only half as much ordnance. On the
other hand, a cost-effective comparison should
also take account of the unsuccessful bombing
raids with unguided bombs involving consid-
erable effort in preparation and almost unaccep-
table risk for both pilots and aircraft, while at
t4
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the same time possibly destroying unintentional
targets.
135. Never before have " smart " bombs been
used to the same extent as in the Gulf war and,
taking into account the results as compared with
unguided bombs, there can be little doubt that
they will be much more widely used in the
future.
136. At the same time experience in the Gulf
war will give a boost to the development of a
new generation of stand-off weapon systems
which will allow attack aircraft to deliver their
explosives with the same degree of accuracy as
the present-day " smart " bombs, but from a
great distance, thus reducing the risks for both
pilot and aircraft.
(iiil SteaLth
137 . Stealth technology has also shown its use-
fulness. In particular, the United States F-l l7s
were effective in the first phases of the air cam-
paign. It should be noted that F-l l7s destroyed
430/o of all Iraqi targets with a success rate of
950/0, while they made only I 210 ofi of a total
of ll4 000 coalition sorties, half of which were
said to be proper fighting missions.
138. On the other hand, it has been observed
that stealth aircraft did not have a monopoly in
taking out the Iraqi air defence system in order
to ensure coalition air superiority. The coalition
forces made intensive use of electronic counter-
measures to jam Iraqi radars and communica-
tions and of defence suppression aircraft to
neutralise surface-to-air missile systems. At the
same time, computerised systems drawing on
tactical intelligence were able to chart coursesfor attacking aircraft which avoided air
defences. All these technologies contributed to
the fact that aircraft without specific stealth
characteristics, such as the F-18s, F-15s, F-l6s
and A-6s, were also able to operate very effec-
tively over Iraqi territory after the initial
phase.
139. Stealth is not necessarily the cure for all
ills. At the present stage of technology, high
stealth characteristics in aircraft design can only
be achieved at the expense of manceuvrability or
multipurpose use. Moreover, the location of
armaments in the fuselage in order not to expose
them to radar waves also has a negative effect on
the capability of the aircraft to take fuel and be
sufficiently armed. The F-l l7 has rather
restricted autonomy and can only take two tons
of arms, a third that of other modern attack air-
craft. Moreover, the price of a F-l17, generally
estimated at about $ t S0 mittion, compels mil-
itary commanders to think twice before they
send the aircraft on mission.
140. A likely conclusion seems to be that for
certain operations in heavily-defended areas the
use of stealth aircraft is justified. The ever more
sophisticated panoply of electronic warfare
systems and other high-technology support
systems may however ensure effective opera-
tional deployment of more conventional attack
aircraft for some years to come, and that at a rel-
atively more acceptable price.
(iv) Air tansport capacity
L4l. Air transport capacity was essential for
moving troops and equipment quickly to the
threatened area at short notice and later for
logistic supply. Here, the United States armed
forces have a significant capacity and they were
able to build on their experience in moving
troops to Western Europe in the framework of
regular NATO exercises. Yet with their
extensive fleet of C-l4l Airlifters and C-5 Gal-
axies they still had to requisition civilian car-
riers in order to complete the task.
142. The European members of the coalition
force found there were serious deficiencies in
their air transport capacity. The French made
3 200 flight hours to transport 5 500 troops
and 2 500 tons of freight, mainly with C-160
Transalls and aged DC-8s. The Dutch made
80 flights with different aircraft, including
German Transalls, Belgian and Portuguese
C-130 Hercules, the United States' C-5 Galaxy
and even Soviet Il-76s and Antonov's 124 in
order to move two Patriot squadrons from
Germany to Turkey. lt is said that C-5 Galaxies,
which were not available in large numbers at
that time, could have done the job in l5 flights.
143. In the light of these experiences, it would
make sense if Western European countries seri-
ously considered the creation of a large aircraft
transport force for joint use, which could be
co-ordinated by WEU.
(v) Ballistic missile de.fence
144. The launching of modified Scud ballistic
missiles towards Saudi Arabia and Israeli ter-
ritory was certainly one of the aspects of the
war which received almost disproportionate
attention. Even if these attacks caused relatively
little destruction, they had an important psycho-
logical impact which need not be explained
in full here. Unfortunately, they also needed
far more attention from the military than
expected.
145. Initially, it was thought that 50/o of all air
activity would be needed in the first days of the
war to eliminate all Iraqi ballistic missiles. In
fact it took 150/o of the coalition's war activity
during most of the war, while at short notice an
effective warning and defence system had to be
set up comprising satellite observation. recon-
naissance systems, fighter-bombers and Patriot
missiles. The Patriot surface-to-air missile
became world-famous overnight in its anti-
missile r6le for which it was not originally
l5
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designed. Undoubtedly it was a great success,
but here as well, the psychological impact may
have been more important than the destructive
impact on incoming missiles. The ballistic
missile threat and possible defence systems will
be examined in greater detail in chapter VI of
the report.
(ri) Electronicwar.fare
146. Although electronic warfare methods have
been used in other war theatres, the Gulf war
was the primary larger scale war in which the
full range of electronic warfare equipment came
into action. As an example, it should be men-
tioned that at the beginning of the air war,
EF-11lA Raven electronic warfare aircraft pene-
trated Iraqi airspace in order to jam ground-
based radars and ground control intercept sites,
thus opening the way for following waves of coa-
lition strike aircraft. Apart from this r6le, which
can be performed up to 100 miles from a target
when operating in stand-off mode, the EF-l I lA
can also be used in direct support, in which case
it escorts a formation of strike aircraft to protect
the entire force.
147. Other electronic warfare aircraft used in
the Gulf are the EA-6B Prowler, the EC-130
Compass Call and the RC-135 Rivet Joint.
148. In order to counter Iraqi air defence, all
combat aircraft were fitted with radar warning
receivers (RWR) 
- 
first developed during World
War II 
- 
and with electronic support measures
(ESM), a much more sophisticated development
which also can initiate action against radar
threat. They were also equipped with chaff,
infrared decoy, flare dispensers and radar and
infrared jammers.
149. Without wishing to play down perfor-
mances, it should nevertheless be said that, for
electronic warfare, the Gulf war was not a valid
test, since Iraq clearly did not use its weapon
systems to best avail. It should also be kept in
mind that the very size of the allied force makes
it difficult to assess the specific contribution of
electronic warfare.
(vii) CiI (command, control, communications
and intelligence)
150. As could have been expected in a theatre
of war with very little existing infrastructure and
a number of different coalition partners oper-
ating 
- 
in some cases with equipment identical
to that used by Iraqi forces 
- 
C3I equipment was
of primary importance e. Suffice it here to say
that the E-3A airborne early warning and control
aircraft were extremely useful for all coalition
air operations. Furthermore, the Gulf provided
an opportunity to test in practice some of
9. An earlier report ol this committee (Document
examrned Cll rn full.
the stand-off surveillance and targeting systems
which are under development. These systems
are intended to provide military commanders
with a continuous picture of all possible targets
to be destroyed on battlefield and in rear areas.
The United States deployed two E-8A Joint
STARS development aircraft and their related
ground systems which provided reconnaissance
and battlefield management capability.
151. French forces used a simplified version
of the Orchid6e battlefield surveillance radar,
mounted on a Super Puma helicopter and
baptised Horizon, to track Iraqi convoys trying
to escape when the French troops advanced into
Iraq during the ground offensive.
152. The evaluation of the performances of
both systems will take some time and no final
decision on further development and production
has yet been made.
(viii) Role o.f helicopters
153. Altogether, the coalition forces in the Gulf
deployed approximately 2 300 helicopters which
were used for many different r6les such as
anti-tank and ground-support but also attack,
transport. anti-surface ships and anti-submarine
warfare and in special missions.
154. Interestingly, right at the beginning of the
air war, commanders preferred to use heli-
copters rather than fixed-wing aircraft to attack
crucial enemy radar sites because they wanted to
be sure that the targets attacked had in fact been
destroyed.
155. Some thirty specialised Sikorsky Black
Hawk helicopters were used in electronic
warfare activities. The French army deployed its
battlefield surveillance Super Puma helicopter
with a reduced version of the Orchid6e system,
now called Horizon.
156. Among the main problems met by heli-
copters, frequent reference is made to refuelling,
night flying and identification of friendly ground
forces.
l5'7. Some incidents have been reported about
the use of anti-armour missiles by AH-64
Apache and AH-1/W Super Cobra helicopters.
Hellfire missiles. with a theoretical range of
8 km, were fired from a " security distance " for
the crews, while the identification systems had
an effective range of only 2 to 4 km. Such casual
use of missiles led to the destruction of a
number of coalition vehicles and to casualties
among their crew members.
158. Even the best stopgap measures to
prevent such incidents proved to be ineffective
at long range. Efforts will have to be made to
develop a more reliable system for identification
of friendly forces by ground support aviation.
l6
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159. The refuelling of helicopters was con-
sidered an " Achilles heel " during operation
Desert Storm. In a number of operations, attack
helicopters were accompanied by larger CH-47D
medium-lift helicopters, but these sometimes
were too slow and vulnerable. Helicopter opera-
trons could be more efficient with faster refu-
elling helicopters, faster pumps and improved
bladder tanks.
160. Night flying also caused problems, espe-
cially in the first months of the deployment of
coalition forces. Intensified training with night
vision goggles helped to improve security, but
there is a need to accelerate the development of
an obstacle avoidance system.
YI. The hallistic missile threat
16l. The Gulf war was the first time western
allied forces came face to face with ballistic mis-
siles launched by an adversary. Although their
destructive effect was relatively modest, they
certainly had a psychological impact, if not on
the military then certainly on the public in areas
under threat and on public opinion in general.
The use of ballistic missiles by the Iraqi forces
was no surprise and while precautions had been
taken, few experts believed that these missiles
would be equipped with chemical or nuclear
warheads.
162. The question that remains is whether in a
subsequent crisis involving Middle Eastern or
North African countries, western allied troops or
even western European soil will remain
unthreatened or unharmed. Ballistic missile
developments in the Middle East and North
Africa deserve much closer attention.
163. The Middle East has long been an
insecure regron. The high proportion of the gross
national product (GNP) allocated to military
expenditure reflects the state of insecurity (60/o
to 27 .5o/o of the GNP, compared to an average of
4.50/o for the OECD member states). The Middle
East is the biggest third world arms market, and
will probably remain the most unstable region
in the world, despite post Gulf war peace-
scenarios. The destabilising hightech arms race
in that region is not expected to come to an end
in the near future.
164. One of the most destabilising trends in
this arms race has been the proliferation of
ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles (BMs) are
unmanned, self-propelled weapon-delivery vehi-
cles, using a surface-to-surface ballistic tra-jectory. They may or may not fly through outer
space, be guided to the target and their range
may be between tens and thousands of kilom-
eters.
165. It has been estimated that there are at
least twenty third world countries currently pos-
sessing BMs or striving to develop them. Brazil
and India, making use of their ballistic missile
technology have even developed a full space pro-
gramme, also focused on the export market.
166. India started its ballistic missile pro-
gramme as early as in the 1950s and in the
1960s Egypt, with German technical assistance,
and Israel followed India's lead. In the 1970s
Libya, again with German assistance, South
Korea and Taiwan took up ballistic missile
development.
167. In the Middle East context, missile prolif-
eration commenced during the early part of the
1980s, catalysed by the start of the Gulf war
between Iraq and Iran during which both Iraq
and Iran used ballistic missiles against each
other's territory, primarily as supreme terror
weapons. Since then, other Middle Eastern
countries began stockpiling such missiles. Cur-
rently ten Middle Eastern countries possess bal-
listic missiles purchased from abroad: Algeria,
Egypt, Iran, Iraqr0, Israel, Kuwait, Libya, Saudi
Arabia, Syria and Yemen. Five countries are or
have been developing their own independent
missile capabilities: Egypt, Iran, Iraq. Libya and
Israel.
168. These missiles with their putative chemi-
cal and even nuclear accoutrements, worry Israel
especially because they upset the military
balance which has long favoured them. It is no
longer threatened purely by neighbouring states.
During the last Gulf war, Iraq showed its ability
to reach Israeli territory with ballistic missiles.
The Israelis also regard Libya as a potential
enemy.
169. Not only the Middle East region is
threatened by this missile proliferation. Parts of
southern Europe and the Soviet Union are now
within reach of some Middle Eastern ballistic
missile systems. The day may not be far away
when Western Europe capitals can be within
range of such missiles from a Middle East base.
170. Most ballistic missile systems in the
inventory of Middle Eastern countries are
Soviet made. Soviet-made ballistic missiles can
be found in Egypt, Iraq, Kuwait (until August
1990), Libya, Syria and Yemen. North Korea
has also delivered Soviet-made or developed
ballistic missile systems. Only last February. it
delivered 24 medium-range Scud C missiles to
Syria.
17l. The most common Soviet-made ballistic
missile systems to be found in the Middle East
are the Frog 7, with only a 70 km range and the
Scud B, with a 280 km range. With foreign
assistance, Iraq has developed longer-range ver-
sions of the Scud B. This has resulted in the
650 km range Al Hussein and 900 km range Al
10. Many if not
destroyed by the
most of Iraqi and Kuwaiti mrsstles were
alhed forces dunng the Gulf war.
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Abbas. During the Gulf war some of the missiles
launched by Iraq were, according to some
sources, in fact Al Husseins. The North Korean
Scud C missiles, delivered by North Korea to
Syria, are also upgraded Scud Bs and are sup-
posed to have a 500 km range.
172. The United States delivered ballistic mis-
siles to Israel until 1974, from which year
further deliveries were prohibited. On the other
hand, the Soviet Union continued to deliver
such missiles during the 1980s. China delivered
ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia which have a
range of between 2 200-3 500 km. Libya and
Syria have also been trying to acquire ballistic
missiles from China. but recent United States
pressure on China prevented these sales. The
Soviet approach to ballistic missile sales to the
Middle East is also changing, especially since the
signing of the INF Treaty. At the moment this
leaves only North Korea as the most likely alter-
native supplier.
173. The Egyptians have been co-operating
with North Korea and with Iraq and Argentina
to develop their own ballistic missile systems.
Iraqi developments have already been meq-
tioned before. Israel has also been developing
new systems. The I 400 km range Jericho II is
the latest example of the Israeli missile devel-
opment. Furthermore, Israel launched two spy
satellites, one in 1988 and one in 1990, and is
also developing an anti-ballistic missile, called
the Arrow, in co-operation with the United
States.
174. It is widely believed that Israel has a
nuclear weapons programme since the 1960s. It
is also generally assumed that from the early
1980s, Iraq has been trying to develop a military
nuclear capability, although it is a signatory of
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Only recently it
became known that Algeria, with Chinese
assistance, is also developing its own military
nuclear technology. The CIA has informed the
competent committee of the United States Con-
gress that Chinese experts are helping Algeria to
develop nuclear warheads to be used on Scud-B
missiles (with a 280 km range) which it obtained
from the Soviet Union. According to the British
intelligence services, Algeria. which is not a
signatory of the non-proliferation treaty, could
have this nuclear capability operational by
1998 il.
175. Iraq, Iran, Syria 
- 
and probably Egypt and
Libya 
- 
possess chemical weapons. Syria and
Iraq are also believed to have acquired facilities
to develop biological agents. Theoretically, both
kinds of weapons can be deployed in missile
warheads. It should, however, be noted that for
a number of reasons, a chemical weapons
payload on a single missile is not capable of cov-
ering a large area. The technical know-how to
equip a missile with chemical weapons is also
very complicated and this may be a reason why
Iraq did not follow up to its threat to launch bal-
listic missiles with chemical warheads at Israeli
territory during the Gulf war.
116. The end of the cold war and the disso-
lution of the Warsaw Pact has enabled the West
to divert its attention to the proliferation ofbal-
listic missiles throughout the developing world.
A massive Soviet nuclear missile attack is now
thought to be most unlikely although the current
unrest in the Soviet Union may have increased
the danger of an unauthorised missile launch.
Today, the more likely ballistic missile threat
towards the developed world could come from
the developing world.
177. In order to control or diminish the bal-
listic missile threat from developing countries, a
number of western countries have established a
missile technology control r6gime (MTCR) 
'r.There are, however, some flaws in the MTCR
which make it less than perfect. Firstly, it makes
a distinction between military missile and
civilian space-launched programmes, secondly,
the dual-use area is too vague, i.e. it has been
exploited by both buying and selling countries
and thirdly it has a too limited membership, not
including the most aggressive exporters of
missile systems, notably the Soviet Union and,
to a lesser extent, China, North Korea, Brazil
and Argentina.
178. Other institutional means which could
help to diminish the threat are a chemical
weapon convention to limit and abolish the pro-
liferation and production of those weapons and
an improved non-proliferation treaty, also pro-
vided with better verification possibilities. It
remains to be seen whether the post Gulf war era
offers good opportunities to make progress in
this field. Meanwhile, several countries, Iacking
confidence in early agreement on these issues,
have decided to develop anti-ballistic-missile
systems. Operations in the Gulf war certainly
gave a boost to such programmes.
179. As regards ballistic missiles, the Gulf war
at least led to three early conclusions:
(i) the ballistic missile threat from
developing countries is a real one;
(ii) it is more difficult than antrcipated to
find and destroy such missiles on
enemy territory before they are
used;
(iii) active missile defence actually can
work in battle.
180. During the Gulf war, Patriot air defence
missiles intended for use against aircraft were
12. Particrpants rn thls agreement are no\\ : Austraha.
Belgrum, Canada. Denmark, France, Germanl'. Ital1,. Japan.
Luxembourg. the Netherlands, New Zcaland. Norway.
Sparn. the Untted Krngdom and thc Unrted States.
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deployed with their software adapted in order to
operate against the Iraqi Scud or Scud deriv-
ative ballistic missiles which were launched
against Israeli and Saudi Arabian territory.
l8l. No doubt the Patriot made an important
psychological contribution in convincing the
population that something could be done against
incoming missiles, but it did not completely
fulfil its military mission.
182. According to a testimony before the
United States House Armed Services Com-
mittee, many, if not most Patriot missiles appar-
ently failed to destroy the Scud's explosive war-
heads or otherwrse render the missiles harmless.
The Patriots rather diverted the Scuds from one
trajectory to another or cut them into large
chunks. which were still capable of inflicting
casualties or damage upon impact.
183. In the same testimony it was said that a
total of 158 missiles, which cost an estimated $ I
million each, were used to engage 47 of the more
than 70 Scud missiles launched by Iraqi military
forces at Israel and Saudi Arabia. Army officials
said 45 of the Scuds were intercepted, and the
others that were not engaged were allowed to fall
into unpopulated areas or were fired at Israel in
the first few days of the air war, before Patriot
batteries were sent there rr.
184. In support of the Patriot, it should be said
that it was developed to be a point-defence
system, designed to defend a single target rather
than an entire area or region. This task was
readily met by the deflection or disintegration 
-
not the destruction 
- 
of incoming missiles.
Moreover. the extended range Scuds mostly fell
apart in the last phase of their trajectory towards
the target, which made it even more difficult for
Patriots to destroy the Scud warheads.
185. In the United States, new initiatives con-
cerning air defences and the ballistic missile
threat are now being placed under the strategic
defence initiative (SDI) umbrella. The Gulf war
has enhanced the importance of these initia-
tives.
186. The first to be mentioned is the air
defence modernisation plan of the American
Ministry of Defence, which includes the devel-
opment of the Corps surface-to-air missile
(Corpsam) to be used by the United States army.
This missile system will be designed to counter
high-speed fighter aircraft and tactical missiles
and will replace the medium-range Hawk missile
system. Procurement is expected by 1998.
187. The Gulf war has also put a new focus on
the strategic defence initiative (SDI). The
SDI will now divert more attention to what is
called global protection against limited strikes
(GPALS). While the SDI was originally estab-
lished to create a space-based missile defence
system, now land-based defence systems such as
the tactical missile defence initiative (TMDI)
will also be developed under its umbrella.
188. TMDI includes the upgrading of the
Patriot missile system and the development of
three new anti-missile missile systems. All these
systems will be part of the ground-based inter-
ceptor system in addition to the space-based
interceptor components of SDI. The ground-
based interceptor component of SDI is designed
to protect larger-than-theatre areas against high-
speed long-range ballistic missiles.
189. The three new anti-missile systems are:
- 
Erint: the extended range interceptor.
- 
Thaad: the theatre high-altitude
defence interceptor.
- 
Arrow: an anti-missile system being
developed by Israel with 800/o United
States funding.
190. The United States army corps surface-
to-air missile project will also get assistance
from the SDI organisation.
191. The proposed GPALS architecture will
still continue to make use of the revised space-
based defence system to be developed. better
known as Brilliant Pebbles. The new revised
SDI programme, as proposed by the Pentagon,
now includes five elements: Phase I defence:
systems primarily intended to provide low to
moderate protection against large-scale ballistic
missile attacks (an outer-space defence system
or Brilliant Pebbles); limited protection systems:
providing protection against Iimited ballistic
missile attacks; theatre and anti-tactical ballistic
missile defence (thus including TMDI);
follow-on systems: these projects are aimed at
provrding highly effective defence in the 2lst
century; research and support activities.
192. It should be mentioned here that the
ultimate decision on the development and
funding of the SDI is in the hands of the
American Congress, known to favour the
funding of ground-based interceptor systems
over space-based ones. Since the outer-space
components of the SDI are also in violation with
the 1972 ABM Treaty, some politicians are
more likely to focus attention on the ground-
based interceptor (GBI) systems. Others
advocate separating the TMDI from the SDI
because of the technological differences between
ground-based and space-based programmes.
193. For the financial year 1991. the SDI will
take over the $218 million appropriated by the
Congress for further Patriot improvements and
for the Arrow and Erint programmes. In 1992
and 1993, this specific budget is expected to
grow to over $550 million and to be appro-
priated to TMDI, R&D, testing and evaluation,
all under SDI supervision.
l9
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194. The already mentioned Arrow project by
Israel is also being speeded up, as a result of
Gulf war experience and because of Syria's
recent acquisitions of improved Scud missiles
from North Korea. The Arrow will intercept
incoming missiles at a greater distance and at a
higher altitude than the Patriot, avoiding the
problem of a rain of destructive missile parts on
target areas.
195. In Europe there is also a move towards air
defence programmes. Besides new anti-aircraft
missiles, studies are now being made on the
development of an anti-tactical ballistic missile(ATBM) capability.
196. France and Italy started first in Europe
with the development of a future surface-to-air
family of missiles (FSAF). Apart from ground-
launched missiles, this programme also envi-
sages naval versions. More on this specific pro-
gramme will be said in Chapter VII.
197. Germany is involved in the American
Corpsam project and, together with France and
Italy, is studying an ATBM project to be
developed in the near future. The German
requirement calls for a system with substantial
capabilities against tactical missiles, which the
other countries have so far not asked for. It is no
secret that Italy would also like such a system in
the future but it lacks the financial means to
develop one. France is still debating whether or
not it needs an ATBM system and Britain
already made it clear that it has no requirement
for an ATBM capability.
198. The best defence against ballistic missiles
from the developing world would be to stop pro-
liferation. Nevertheless, as long as the interna-
tional situation precludes the conclusion of a
waterproof agreement on the proliferation and
control of military ballistic missile technology,
allied nations will have to concentrate on bal-
listic missile defence systems in order to protect
themselves against threat, blackmail or destruc-
tion.
VII. Developments in main European
collaborative equipment programmes
199. With recent events in mind, it is not
devoid of interest to have a closer look at
the state of affairs in the major European
co-operation programmes dealing with equip-
ment which apparently deserves priority. The
decision to mention only collaborative arms
programmes was made deliberately because it is
thought that this is the only viable way to
develop new equipment which is up to the best
standards. The multiple reasons for European
arms co-operation have been explained so often
in recent reports of this committee that there is
no need to repeat them in detail again ra. Suffice
it to say here that the well-known arguments in
favour of this have recently been strongly rein-
forced by reductions in national defence budgets
and by firm intentions of the allied nations to
set up multinational units.
200. At the moment there are still some major
national equipment programmes either in the
development stage or coming to fruition, such as
the French Rafale multirdle combat aircraft and
the Leclerc main battle tank or the British Chal-
lenger II main battle tank. Nevertheless it is gen-
erally assumed that programmes of comparable
importance henceforward will be set up on a
multinational collaborative basis.
(i) The EFA programme
201. The collaborative programme to develop
and build the new European fighter aircraft
(EFA) for the air forces of Germany (330/o), Italy
(2lo/o), Spain (130/o) and the United Kingdom
(330/o) has fallen about one year behind schedule
and the first prototype flight is now expected in
the spring of 1992. Entry into service is planned
in the summer of 1991, but according to some
experts this may well be delayed until 1998-99.
The four air forces together had an original
requirement for 7 65 aircraft, but with the
announced slimming down of armed forces and
decline in defence expenditure it is more real-
istic to put the total requirement at about 550
aircraft. Moreover, the programme is meeting
with political opposition, particularly in
Germany.
202. In February 1991, the German Gov-
ernment declared that it would implement its
obligations for the development phase of the
EFA programme which will be finished by the
end of 1991. Strong doubts persist, however,
with regard to its commitment to the following
phases of the programme, including production.
While EFA alternatives have already been
studied and dismissed by the German defence
ministry and the Luftwaffe, the government has
now established a special working group of
defence and budget experts to study EFA and its
alternatives again. The alternatives for EFA are
the McDonnell Douglas F-15 and F/A-18,
General Dynamics F-16, Dassault Rafale, an
upgraded version of the Panavia Tornado IDS
and the Mikoyan MiG-29 Fulcrum. The SPD,
the largest opposition party, has already
declared its opposition to the EFA programme,
which it considers too expensive. It also has
strong doubts about the requirement for a new
I-rghter aircraft due to the changes in Central
Europe and the consequences they should have
for the German armed forces.
203. In April 1991, the Luftwaffe announced
that it had dropped its total requirement for
20
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EFA to 160, as compared to the original
requirement of 250 aircraft.
204. The question whether Germany needs a
modern air force to defend itself and its interests
and, if so, what kind of aircraft would best fit
the financial possibilities and military require-
ments should be answered by politicians. They
should. however, also take another aspect into
consideration: if Germany does not participate
in the production of EFA, the know-how and
capability of its high-technology industry to
build a sophisticated aircraft " will be placed at
great risk for many years to come " (Ji.irgen
Schrempp, chairman of Deutsche Aerospace in
Aviation International, l5th March l99l).
205. Until now, the United Kingdom, Italy and
Spain, the other partners in EFA's development,
have not expressed doubts about their full com-
mitment to the programme.
206. Under budgetary pressure, the United
Kingdom might wish to buy less than the ini-
tially intended 250 aircraft, but such a decision
would not lead to important financial savings
because of reduced economies of scale. The
British government's attitude leaves little doubt
that the programme will be pursued even in the
event of a possible German pull-out. It main-
tains that the United Kingdom needs an air
superiority fighter to provide air cover for
friendly troops and to escort friendly attack air-
craft, especially with recent Gulf war experi-
ences in mind and in the event of a likely shift of
emphasis from offensive to defensive counter-
air r6les. The multirdle capability of EFA is also
considered a benefit. because this will make it
easier to standardise on fewer aircraft types and
provide flexibility to tailor the air capability to
fit different types of mission.
207 . Italy, with a 210/o stake in the programme,
has certainly the most urgent requirement for
EFA, considering the large number of aged
F-104s still in its inventory. Moreover, if the
threat to its security from Eastern Europe has
greatly diminished, it has increased on its
southern flank.
208. Similarly, the Spanish Government, which
has always considered the threat from Eastern
Europe to be exaggerated, sees a growing threat
from the potentially unstable situation in North
Africa. Notwithstanding a modernisation pro-
gramme including the acquisition of EF-18
Hornets, a large part of its air force is still
equipped with outdated aircraft. Spain con-
siders its participation in the EFA programme
vital both for the capability of its air force to
perform its r6les and for the development of its
aerospace industry which is relatively weak in
sophisticated aircraft design and equipment.
209. At the moment, the prevailing opinion
among partners in the programme is that buying
a United States alternative which exists or is still
under development (ATF) would either not
meet requirements or, in the case of the ATF at
an estimated price of $73 million each, be too
expensive. On top of that, and possibly more
important, it would undermine a number of
national aerospace industries and damage
European technological competitiveness.
(ii) The Franco-German anti-tank/cornbat
support helicopter Tiger
210. After many years of trouble and reciprocal
questioning, the Franco-German Tiger heli-
copter programme is now well under way. In
early February 1991, the first of five prototypes
was unveiled in Munich and flight testing
started at Marignane in April. The MTR 390
engines, a collaborative programme of MTU,
Turbomeca and Rolls-Royce, have already
passed through an earlier test programme on an
Aerospatiale Dauphin helicopter.
2ll. France is still expected to order a total of
21 5 helicopters in the combat support and
anti-tank version while Germany will procure
212 helicopters in the anti-tank version. Since
the other European anti-tank helicopter pro-
gramme, Tonal, collapsed, Spain has expressed
its interest in 50 multir6le Tigers. The United
Kingdom, also a former Tonal participant is
going to study the Tiger as a possible alternative
for its anti-tank helicopter requirement which
might concern more than 100 helicopters.
(iii) EH-101 helicopter
212. After a two-year delay in the British-
Italian collaborative programme for a 15 ton
helicopter in a naval, transport and civilian
version between Westland and Agusta, the
EH-l0l is now well under way and seven of the
nine pre-production helicopters have now made
a total of 500 flight hours together. The devel-
opment of a naval version for the British and
Italian navy has priority.
213. The Royal Navy is expected to place its
first production order of 50 EH l0l Merlins
shortly. The size of a second tranche of navy
orders, originally planned to involve 24 heli-
copters. is under review.
(iv) NH-90 tactical transport helicopter
214. In December 1990 and January 1991, the
four nations participating in the NH-90 pro-
gramme, France (Adrospatiale), Germany(MBB), Italy (Agusta) and the Netherlands
(Fokker) signed an agreement to develop the hel-
icopter. There will be one naval version. the
NFH-90 and one tactical transport version, the
TTH-90. The financial participation in the
development phase is distributed as follows:
France 43.350/0, Germany 23.650/0, llaly 26.430/o
and the Netherlands 6.57o/o. The first of five pro-
totypes should make its first flight at the end of
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1994 and, if the production contract is signed in
1995, the first production helicopters should be
delivered in 1998. The four partners have a total
initial requirement of 720 helicopters and the
industry is expecting to sell between 350 and
500 helicopters on the military export market.
(v) Future large aircra.ft (FLA)
215. With armed forces becoming smaller, but
more flexible and mobile, there is an urgent
need for increased air transport capacity. as has
already clearly been demonstrated in the Gulf
war.
216. At an earlier stage, there have been unsuc-
cessful attempts to establish an international
collaborative programme called FIMA.
2l'7. It seems however that a number of
European countries have now reached informal
agreement on an outline European staff target
on a future large aircraft (FLA) in the framework
of the IEPG (Independent European Programme
Group). The FLA should be the European suc-
cessor to the existing fleet of C- I 30 Hercules and
C-160 Transall aircraft. At the moment,
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and
Turkey are involved in the co-operative effort.
while the United Kingdom has observer
status.
218. It is expected that funding will be
awarded to Euroflag, a consortium of Alenia,
Aerospatiale, British Aerospace, Casa and
Deutsche Airbus.
219. European studies are focused on a four-
engine aircraft of 100 tons take-off weight with a
20 to 25o/o ton transport capacity, a 4m wide
fuselage and the ability to take off and land on
rugged landing strips.
220. The United States has a similar pro-
gramme, called ATT (advanced theatre
transport) to develop a successor to the C-130
Hercules. Initial talks have been held to examine
possibilities for a new Euro-American pro-
gramme.
(vil NATO.frigate 
.f'or the 1990s (NFR-90)
221. As is well known, the eight-nation pro-
gramme to develop the NFR-90 collapsed at the
end of 1989. Participating countries were
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Nether-
lands, Spain, the United Kingdom and the
United States, with a total requirement of 59
frigates. The development of a common weapon
system and a common combat system have
proved to be particularly difficult stumbling-
blocks.
222. Recent developments have demonstrated
that a likely diminishrng threat from Soviet
naval operations does not mean that the
requirement for new frigates has suddenly disap-
peared. In the Gulf war, a serious air threat for
naval formations existed and it will not be long
before third world countries will be able to pose
a submarine capability.
223. In early March 1991, the navies of France
and the United Kingdom signed a joint
statement of need for a common Anglo-French
frigate, planned to enter service early in the next
decade. They are aiming to achieve a joint staff
requirement by the end of 1992. There is a
French requirement for probably six anti-air
warfare (AAW) frigates while the British need a
replacement for their twelve Type 42 AAW
destroyers, but a number has not yet been given.
The most important common feature will be the
combat management system; minor elements
may vary according to individual preferences.
224. In December 1989, Germany and the
Netherlands signed an agreement to co-operate
on the development of ships and the desrgn
of associated weapons, communications and
command systems with an initial priority for
frigates. Nothing further about this co-operation
has been heard since, and the recent Dutch
defence white paper makes no mention of it.
225. Other countries formerly participating in
the NFR-90 project have not yet clarified their
position as regards a new collaborative frigate
programme.
(vii) Anti-air war.fare system
226. In February 1991, France, Italy, Spain
and the United Kingdom signed a memo-
randum of understanding for the two-year
project definition phase of the local area missile
system (LAMS), a medium-range area defence
system for defence against aircraft which should
be the main anti-air warfare system for at
least the future British, French and Spanish
frigates.
227. Industries involved are Eurosam, a joint
venture between Aerospatiale, Thomson CSF
and Alenia, a British industrial team led by
GEC-Marconi and the Spanish Ibermissile.
228. In fact, LAMS should be considered as the
first branch of an entire Franco-Italian family of
anti-air missile systems (FAAMS) which should
eventually comprise three major systems:
(a) sur.face-air-antimissile. a naval point-
defence system, with Aster l5 missile
and Thomson-CSF Arabel radar for
the French navy and Selenia Empar
radar for the Italian navy:
(b) medium-range naval su\face-air:
medium-range area defence system,
using the extended-range Aster 30
missile for defence against aircraft,
and Thomson-CSF Astral surveillance
radar. This version could also be
adapted to meet the British and
22
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Spanish requirement for a local area
missile system, the abovementioned
LAMS.
(c) medium-range ground-air: a ground-
based version of the above, using
the Thomson-CSF Arabel radar and
intended to replace the Raytheon
Hawk.
229. At the end of 1990, Germany had pro-
posed to develop the last of the three missiles
mentioned into a system with an anti-tactical
ballistic missile capability. France and Italy are
now considering this proposal.
230. NAAWS (NATO anti-air warfare system)
is a parallel and competing programme for
a local area ship defence against highly
manceuvrable missiles with low radar cross sec-
tions. There can be little hope for it to remain
alive as the United States withdrew in February
1991, leaving Canada and the Netherlands as
the only remaining participants.
(viii) Modular stand-oJf v,eapon (MSOW)
231. In the 1980s it was thought that the
NATO allied force should have a long-range
stand-off attack capability which would enable it
to destroy Warsaw Pact targets while protecting
delivery aircraft from enemy air defence
systems.
232. Different initiatives were then combined
into the modular stand-off weapon (MSOW)
programme, intended to meet the stand-off
weapon needs of Canada, France, West
Germany, Italy, Spain, the United Kingdom and
the United States.
233. The idea was to develop one medium-
range weapon against mobile targets ( I 5-30 km),
one against fixed sites (30-50 km) and one long-
range weapon against fixed and mobile
targets.
234. Notwithstanding the initial enthusiasm of
many participants, it appeared at an early stage
that too many obstacles stood in the way, and
after the withdrawal of France and Canada in
1988 and the subsequent withdrawal of the
United States and the United Kingdom, the pro-
gramme was cancelled in June 1989.
235. At the moment, France is the only
European country with a full stand-off weapon
programme. The Apache, now a stand-off
missile with a 150 km range and a payload of up
to '770 kg, is in its development phase. It is
expected to come into service around 1995.
236. AII United Kingdom programmes in this
field. such as the RAF stand-off anti-armour
weapon and the low-level laser-guided bomb,
have been abandoned.
(ix) Autonomous precision-guided munition
(APGM)
237. The APGM programme sought to develop
smart anti-armour munition by rncreasing both
the range and accuracy of l55mm artillery pro-jectiles. Initially, France, the Federal Republic
of Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, Sparn,
Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United
States were involved. After the withdrawal of
the United States because of problems of tech-
nology transfer and reductions in defence
spending the programme lost rts impetus. In
July 1989, the remaining participants agreed
that they could not afford to continue the pro-
gramme.
(r) Advanced short range air-to-air rnissile
(ASRAAM)
238. According to a long-standing memo-
raridum of understanding concerning a new
family of weapons, the United States was to
develop and build the advanced medium range
air-to-air missile (AMRAAM), while a number
of European nations would design and build
ASRAAM.
239. At the moment, AMRAAM is entering
service with the United States Air Force, while
ASRAAM is not even at the development stage.
Since July 1989, Canada, the Federal Republic
of Germany and Norway have pulled out,
leaving the United Kingdom (British Aerospace)
as the only remaining European partner.
240. Matra-Marconi has now proposed its
MICASRAAM as an alternative for further
development to the British Aerospace ASRAAM
proposal. The French-British firm has said that
the MICASRAAM could be available in 1995.
YIII. New equipment requirements
241. In order to make sure that European
armed forces will be able to meet the obligations
devolving from their new tasks, a close exami-
nation should be made of equipment require-
ments. Are existing requirements still valid?
Should they be changed completely or will slight
modifications be sufficient?
242. It should be well understood that this
report intends only to indicate likely trends and
their consequences. At the same time an effort is
being made to see if this framework offers spe-
cific opportunities for WEU to contribute to an
improved capability in maintaining peace and
security.
243. In Chapter III the basic principles for the
future allied force structures were explained.
There will be smaller forces and part of them
will have a lower degree of readiness. Flexibility
and mobility are considered essential. Rein-
forcement through reserve forces will be more
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important and major formations will be multi-
national.
244. As a consequence of these new force struc-
tures, new equipment requirements will most
probably focus on improved performance and
capabilities in:
- 
out-of-area operations;
- 
mobility within the whole territory of
the European allies;
- 
command, control and communica-
tions;
- 
detection and verification equipment.
245. Moreover, with much of the older equip-
ment being phased out as a consequence of
the CFE agreement and smaller quantities
remaining, the upgrading of existing equipment
will receive more attention.
246. Even if the use of sophisticated high tech-
nology equipment in the Gulf war as mentioned
in Chapter V may have appeared revolutionary
to the general public 
- 
influenced by a slightly
coloured media coverage 
- 
most of it was either
developed in the 1970s or based on 1970s tech-
nology. Full-scale development of the F-ll7A
Stealth aircraft, for instance, started in 1978 and
the aircraft made its first flight in June l98l and
entered service in 1983, while precision-guided
bombs were already used in the Vietnam war.
Important present-day equipment development
programmes are almost all aiming at further
improvement of equipment which has proved
its usefulness in the Gulf war.
247. Two areas where the Europeans had given
up their collaborative efforts, the modular
stand-off weapon (MSOW) and autonomous
precision-guided munition (APGM) may have
to be reconsidered in the light of recent war
experience.
248. As said earlier, stand-off capability dimin-
ishes the risks for delivering aircraft, while pre-
cision guidance, be it through an autonomous
or a remotely-operated system, incomparably
enhances the probability of hitting the target.
Originally, the APGM was meant to enhance the
effectiveness of artillery against concentrations
of Warsaw Pact armoured vehicles in the
Central European theatre. Under present cir-
cumstances, the need for APGM may be less
pressing, but part of this technology, combined
with MSOW technology could be used in a new
collaborative European programme. Precision-
guided bombs and smart stand-off weapons can
play a decisive rOle in destroying high priority
targets. They may save human lives and prevent
pointless destruction. In the alliance, only the
United States and France have determined new
programmes in this area. Can the rest of Europe
afford to remain on the sideline or has it defi-
nitely thrown in the sponge?
249. In the framework of NATO, several
long-term programmes exist to improve and
extend the C3 capabilities of the allied countries,
as has been explained in an earlier report ofthis
committeers. These programmes deserve full
attention, also because they enhance the effec-
tiveness of smaller forces.
250. Another area where serious deficiencies
are coming to light is airlift capability. In
Chapter V, some examples are given of the
alarming lack of air transport capacity in some
of the allied countries participating in the Gulf
war effort. Six European countries are now
involved in the early phase of a future large air-
craft (FLA) programme in order to develop a
replacement for the C-130 Hercules, C-160
Transall and the G-222. Apart from that, newly-
perceived security risks and accordingly-adapted
force structures also call for long-haul strategic
air transport, a capacity which understandably,
until now, has been rather neglected in Euro-
pean armed forces.
251. Of all European armed forces, only
France and the United Kingdom have a strategic
airlift capability. As for France, it now has four
DC-8Fs, aged between 25 and 30 years, of which
two will be phased out shortly, while the other
two, with a bit of luck, will remain in service
until the end of the decade. The United
Kingdom has one squadron of VC-10 Mk-ls
which also may need early replacement around
the turn of the century.
252. For a proper strategic airlift capability, a
number of European countries would need air-
craft of the size of the C-I7A, now under devel-
opment in the United States. There is no
question, however, of buying this aircraft
because of its unit cost of more than $200
million. Recently, suggestions were made for a
European solution.
253. In April last, the French and German
armed forces made it known that they are exam-
ining the possibilities for the development and
procurement of military versions of the Airbus
A-340 long-distance carrier for transporting
troops and heavy loads and the in-flight refu-
elling of combat aircraft.
254. More specifically under study is the
A-340-300 version with a 9 000 km range. The
different military versions could be:
- 
4-340 M, carrying 295 passengers and
20 tons of freight or 434 passengers
with 2 refuelling pods under its wings
for in-flight refuelling;
- 
A-340 M cargo for heavy loads, such as
battle-tanks, likewise provided with two
refuelling pods;
I5. Developments in command, control. communrcatrons
and intetligence (C3l). by Mr. Hrll. Rapporteur. Document
1229. adopted by the Assembly rn June 1990.
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- 
A-340 M tanker with a capacity of 128
tons of fuel and three refuelling pods.
255. Apparently there is still much uncertainty
about the cost of this military Airbus, but the
unit cost of an 4-340 M is estimated to be
between $120 and 150 million.
256. If early decisions to go ahead with such a
programme are taken, the first military A-340s
could enter into service by the mid-1990s.
257. Suggestions have been made that in view
of the considerable cost of a reasonably-sized
strategic airlift capability, European countries
should make it a joint effort. Following the
example of NATO's AWACS fleet, Western
European Union could be the organisation to
create a strategic airlift command at the disposal
of its member states' armed forces. This subject
could be discussed in a following meeting of the
chiefs of defence staff of the WEU member
states, who met several times during the Gulf
crisis and lastly on lOth April for an informal
exchange of views on the development of
European military co-operation, particularly in
the light of lessons learned from the Iraqi con-
flict. Recent examples such as Western Europe's
naval presence in the Gulf war and the humani-
tarian aid to Kurdish refugees have shown that
WEU can play a positive r6le in a practical sense
too, reinforcing an allied effort and enabling its
member states to stand shoulder to shoulder
with their United States ally if circumstances
require action and not merely words.
258. One long-standing pet subject of the
Assembly certainly obtained additional interest
through the Gulf war: a European observation
satellite agency. Chapter V included reference to
the r6le of observation satellites. It is no use
repeating the arguments which the Assembly has
put forward in three different reports and
recommendations16. They are well known,
recognised by the Council and now reinforced
by recent events in the Gulf.
259. In the Council's reply to Recommen-
dation 482, it reported that, at the meeting of
the WEU Council of Ministers on lOth
December 1990:
" Ministers asked the experts to study
further the practical arrangements for
setting up a satellite data interpretation
centre so that they could reach a decision
at their Council meeting in spring 1991.
The Sub-Group on Space was also man-
dated to submit to that meeting its conclu-
sions on the needs for studies on medium-
and long-term space co-operation. "
260. It is hoped that at their spring l99l
meeting, to be held in June 1991, the Ministers
will take a firm decision, thus setting the pace in
order to meet an urgent requirement of Western
European Union's member states.
16. Documents 1159, ll60 and
465, 466 and 482.
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